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Abstract—To address the exponentially increasing data rate
demands of end users, necessitates efficient spectrum allocation
among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum
bands to cater to the temporal and spatial variations of traffic in
the wireless network. In this paper, we address the spectrum al-
location problem among non-cooperative operators via auctions.
The classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) approach provides
the framework for a strategy-proof and social welfare maximiz-
ing auction at high computational complexity, which makes it
infeasible for practical implementation. We propose sealed bid
auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation which are compu-
tationally tractable and hence applicable for allocating spectrum
by performing auctions in short durations as per the dynamic
load variations of the network. We establish that the proposed
algorithm is strategy-proof for uniform demand. Furthermore,
for non-uniform demand we propose a algorithm that satisfies
weak strategy-proofness. We also consider non-linear increase
in the marginal valuations with demand. Simulation results are
presented to exhibit the performance comparison of the proposed
algorithms with VCG and other existing mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
With recent advancements in wireless communication tech-
nologies, the telecom market has witnessed exponential growth
in data traffic in the past few decades. As per the current
trends, mobile data traffic is expected to increase more than
5 times by 2024 [2]. Globally, Fifth Generation (5G) tech-
nology will further escalate the amount of data traffic. With
the rapid development of smart devices, the end user data
rate requirements have also become stringent. Fulfilling the
increasing number of end users with the desired Quality of
Services (QoSs) has further contributed to the crisis of limited,
scarce and expensive “spectrum”. To cater to the requirements
of the end users, there are two possibilities: additional spec-
trum availability or efficient utilization of currently available
spectrum.
Traditionally, the spectrum is allocated statically on lease
for long durations such as one year or more to the service
providers1. Usually, service providers estimate the peak traffic
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conditions of the network and calculate the quantum of spec-
trum accordingly. However, the peak traffic requirements arise
sporadically in the network. This leads to underutilization of
spectrum usage in the long run. Therefore, the static allocation
technique of spectrum is highly inefficient in terms of spec-
trum utilization and not suitable to meet the requirements of
the next generations networks. Moreover, it has been shown
that the traffic conditions in a wireless network vary as a
function of time and location [3]. For instance, while on any
regular day, peak traffic in residential areas is more likely to
occur in the evening, whereas in office areas one may observe
peak traffic during business hours. Thus, the wireless networks
observe significant peak to average traffic ratio [4].
To address the issue of inefficient spectrum usage a compu-
tationally efficient spectrum allocation mechanism is required
so that spectrum can be allocated dynamically considering the
spatial and temporal traffic variations in the network. Auc-
tions are commonly preferred for spectrum allocation among
multiple operators. In our work, we focus on computationally
efficient spectrum allocation mechanisms for spectrum distri-
bution among multiple operators, to ensure that the spectrum
is allocated quickly as per service providers’ demands.
In general, the spectrum is allocated among the operators
using sealed bid auction format. In sealed bid auctions,
interested buyers send their valuations for the object in a
closed envelope along with the demand, to the auctioneer.
Thus, the privacy of the valuation and demand for the object
are ensured for each service provider. In spectrum auctions,
spectrum valuation for a service provider depends on the
desired bandwidth and on other factors such as the number
of subscribers and the services desired by the subscribers.
Hence, the spectrum valuation is a private information of an
operator which is not known to the auctioneer. Generally,
the participants in any auction are selfish and are likely to
misreport the actual valuation to the auctioneer if there is
incentive to do so. Hence, ensuring the strategy-proofness of
auctions is of significant importance [5]. An auction is said to
be strategy-proof if any operator does not gain on deviating
from the true or actual value of their demands of the spectrum.
This implies that even if an operator misreports its valuation, it
can never achieve utility greater than that of the true valuation.
Strategy-proof auctions not only compel the participants
to reveal their true valuations but also makes the process of
spectrum allocation easier for the auctioneer and the operators.
The operators are neither required to perform complex com-
putations nor they have to invest time to determine the optimal
bidding strategy to maximize their utility gains. Hence, it
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2makes the process of resource allocation faster by removing
the time and computational overhead. Moreover, strategy-
proofness also increases the number of participants in an
auction.
In spectrum auctions, three properties are of utmost impor-
tance: strategy-proofness, low computational complexity, and
optimality of allocation to maximize the social welfare [6].
Unfortunately, achieving all three properties simultaneously
in an auction is provably NP-Hard [7]. Vickrey Clarke Groves
(VCG) [8]–[10] is a well-known mechanism which proposes
a framework for guaranteeing strategy-proof behavior in auc-
tions with optimal allocation strategy, but it is computationally
infeasible in large networks [6].
Various Dynamic Spectrum Allocation (DSA) mechanisms
proposed in the literature are designed for single parameter
environment [6], considering one base station per operator.
In these works, it is assumed that individual base stations
participate in the spectrum auction. However, in general, each
operator deploys multiple base stations (BSs) in a geographical
region to cater to the services of the end users. The valuation of
an operator depends on the number of BSs and the amount of
traffic each operator has to serve. Unlike most of the existing
works e.g., [7], [11]–[13], we consider the problem of spec-
trum allocation at the operator level. Unfortunately, achieving
strategy-proof behavior at operator level is more challenging
as the BSs associated with an operator are cooperative in their
behavior. Thus, an operator may misreport the valuation and
demand at few BSs to increase the overall utility gain. Most
of the existing works in spectrum allocation do not address
this aspect of spectrum allocation problem.
We focus on designing efficient strategy-proof mechanisms
which are suitable for implementation in short durations to
handle the spatio-temporal load variations of the network.
First, we propose a strategy-proof mechanism where the
demand at each BS is of single channel. Next, we extend
the mechanism for multiple channel availability with non-
uniform channel requirement (demand) across the BSs and
linearly increasing valuations with demand. Here, we discuss
the scenario when strategy-proofness of the mechanism may
not be ensured. Finally, we propose NUD-WSPAM where BSs
of an operator may have different demands and per channel
valuation is non-increasing at each BS. Here, we introduce the
concept of weak strategy-proofness. We also prove the indi-
vidual rationality, monotonicity and weak strategy-proofness
of NUD-WSPAM.
Monte Carlo simulations are performed in MATLAB [14] to
evaluate the performances of the proposed spectrum allocation
mechanisms. Using simulation results, social welfare and
spectrum utilization of the proposed algorithms in comparison
to other algorithms in the literature e.g. [11] are also evaluated.
Simulations are also performed for large network sizes (i.e.,
large number of BSs) to validate the applicability in practical
scenarios.
A. Related Work
In this section, we review some related work on Dynamic
Spectrum Access (DSA). Auction-based spectrum allocation
approaches have been extensively studied in the literature
[15]–[21]. As stated above, achieving strategy-proof optimal
allocation and computational feasibility in a mechanism is
NP-Hard. In [20], the authors present a DSA mechanism in
cellular networks which achieves near-optimal allocation for
revenue maximization using greedy graph coloring approach.
The authors in [15] studies real-time spectrum allocation
mechanism. Though, the mechanisms proposed in [20], [15]
are computationally feasible in terms of implementation,
they are not guaranteed to be strategy-proof. In [21], the
authors propose a mechanism which ensures a certain fair
chance of spectrum allocation along with the maximization
of social welfare. In [22], the authors propose a revenue
maximization mechanism for spectrum allocation. For revenue
maximization, the combination of well known Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) [8]–[10] mechanism and Myerson’s Lemma
[23] are studied. In [7], the authors proposed VERITAS, a
sealed bid strategy-proof auction mechanism which follows
a certain monotonicity behavior. The authors in [11] propose
another strategy-proof mechanism SMALL which groups non-
conflicting base stations and sacrifices the base station(s)
corresponding to the lowest bid in the winner group. SMALL
has better allocation efficiency than that of the algorithm
proposed in [7]. In [15], the authors propose an auction-based
approach for fine grained (i.e., a channel is sliced into smaller
frequencies) channel allocation. However, it does not satisfy
the strategy-proofness property. As interference is one of the
major concerns in wireless, the authors in [17], propose an
auction based power allocation mechanism. However, it fails
to be strategy-proof.
Both VERITAS [7] and SMALL [11] assume that the chan-
nel valuation increases linearly with the demand. In [12], [24],
[25], strategy-proof double auction mechanisms are studied.
The authors in [26], [27] studies auction-based approaches for
DSA in cognitive networks. In [16], the game-theoretic aspect
of the DSA in cognitive networks is explored.
The authors in [28] consider adaptive-width spectrum allo-
cation problem where the channel valuation is a non-increasing
function of the demand. To take the decrease in valuation with
the demand into account, strategy-proof mechanism SPECIAL
is proposed. Here, it is assumed that all the base stations bid
for all the channels available for auction. To improve the social
welfare and revenue of VERITAS, the concept of reserve price
in valuation is incorporated in [13].
Most of the existing works is centered on designing a com-
putationally feasible strategy-proof spectrum auction mecha-
nism for non-cooperative base station participation in auctions.
Moreover, [7], [11], [12], [20], [21], [24], [25], [27], [28]
consider base stations with uniform channel demand. However,
only few works [7], [11], [28] consider multiple channel
demand across the BSs. Except [28], all the works assume that
the channel valuation scales linearly with the demand, which
may not be true in general as throughput may not increase
linearly as a function of bandwidth.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous works
has considered the operators as the players in the spectrum
auction. In comparison, in our work, we consider that non-
cooperative and rational operators participate in spectrum
3auctions and each operator has multiple BSs. Our work also
considers non-uniform channel requirement at the BSs.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we investigate the problem of spectrum
allocation using sealed bid auction across multiple BSs of
coexisting multiple operators in a geographical region. We
summarize our contributions as follows.
• We consider the problem of spectrum allocation among
coexisting multiple operators in a region. The base sta-
tions associated with each operator are used to provide
services to the end users. We formulate the problem in
multi-parameter environment to maximize the total social
welfare of the auction. This has not been addressed in the
literature so far.
• We propose a strategy-proof spectrum allocation mecha-
nism at operator level, where strategy-proofness holds for
a set of valuations submitted to auctioneer corresponding
to each operator.
• We propose computationally efficient auction mechanism
which are applicable to perform auction repeatedly in
short durations as per traffic variation.
• We propose a generalized spectrum allocation mechanism
which is weakly strategy-proof even if the spectrum
demands are not same across the BSs of an operator.
Further, we also consider the case where the channel
valuation may not be linearly increasing with the demand
of the channels at a base station.
• We analytically prove that the proposed mechanism
follows monotonicity, individual rationality and (weak)
strategy-proofness.
• We compare the performance of the proposed mechanism
with various mechanisms in small as well as in large
networks using Monte Carlo simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model and preliminaries of strategy-proof
auctions. In Section III, we propose a mechanism for single
channel allocation. Section IV proposes an extension of the
mechanism proposed in Section III and describes how it fails
to be strategy-proof through an example. In Section V, the
generalized strategy-proof spectrum allocation mechanism is
presented. We summarize the proposed mechanisms in Section
VI. In Section VII, we evaluate the performance of proposed
mechanisms through simulations. In Section VIII, we conclude
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a geographical region where multiple operators
provide services to the end users. Multiple BSs are associated
with each operator in the given region. The system model
(Fig. 1) comprises a controller for each operator, set of
BSs associated with the operators, auctioneer and spectrum
database. There are two decision making devices, controllers
and auctioneer in the system. Each operator has a controller
which determines the number of channels (demand) required
and the valuation of channels at the BSs associated with
the operator. The demand and the valuation may vary over
Operator 2
Controller 
Operator 1
Controller 
AuctioneerSpectrumDatabase 
Fig. 1: System model.
time depending on the traffic conditions of the wireless
network. The operators communicate their spectrum demand
and valuation at each base station through the controller. The
information of the number of channels available for allocation
is contained in the spectrum database. We assume that the
channels are of equal bandwidth and are orthogonal. Since
orthogonal channels do not have overlapping frequency bands,
simultaneous operations on orthogonal channels do not cause
interference. Auctioneer is another decision making entity,
which decides who should get the spectrum (channel) and what
should be the appropriate price for providing exclusive ‘right
to use’ channel to an operator.
In our work, unlike the other existing works, operators are
bidders (players) instead of individual BSs in the wireless
network. Each operator communicates a vector of bids and
demands to the auctioneer via the controller for the BSs
associated with.
Other assumptions made in our system model are as follows.
•We assume that an auctioneer has knowledge of the topology
in the geographical region. Therefore, the overall conflict
graph consisting of all the BSs participating in the auction
is available to the auctioneer.
• We assume all channels are homogeneous in characteristics
and act as substitutes. Thus, the bid or valuation is channel
independent.
• We consider that operators employ Fractional Frequency
Reuse (FFR) techniques to cancel interference across its
own BSs. Therefore, same frequency band (channel) can be
allocated to the BSs of an operator. Hence, any base station of
an operator would experience interference only from the BSs
associated with other operators in the given region.
We capture the interference among the BSs of the operators
with the help of a graph G = (V, E), that is obtained from
knowledge of the topology in the geographical region, where
V represents the set of vertices (nodes), and E represents the
set of edges in the graph. The set of vertices in the graph
correspond to the BSs of various operators in the region.
Any two base stations are said to interfere with each other,
if the geographical distance between them is less than a
predetermined value d. In this case, there is an edge between
them in the graph. Two interfering BSs (nodes) cannot be
assigned same channel concurrently.
A. Background on Auctions
41) Strategy-Proof Spectrum Auctions: In conventional auc-
tions, once an object is allocated to a buyer, it cannot be
allocated to other buyers. However, in spectrum auctions, same
spectrum (frequency band) can be reused or reallocated after
certain fixed distance depending on the coverage area of BSs.
This implies that any two BSs can be assigned the same
frequency band if they do not interfere with each other. This
feature provides an advantage in terms of spectrum utilization,
but it is more challenging to achieve strategy-proof spectrum
auction. Second price auction mechanism [5] ensures strategy-
proof behavior in conventional auctions. However, the same
is not guaranteed in the spectrum auctions [7]. In second
price auctions, the object goes to the highest bidder and is
charged the price of the second highest bidder in the auction.
Moreover, it is not necessary that every base station of an
operator interferes with each base station of other operators.
Therefore, achieving strategy-proof spectrum allocation across
the multiple BSs of the coexisting operators using second price
auction is not possible. Moreover, it fails to exploit the re-
usability of the spectrum which again results in inefficient
usage of the spectrum.
VCG mechanism is the first strategy-proof mechanism
which always chooses the optimal allocation strategy. VCG
mechanism selects the set of participants that maximizes the
overall sum of valuation in the auction [8]–[10]. But, deter-
mining the optimal allocation and pricing strategy is burdened
with the high computational complexity of the auctions. Due
to high computational cost, VCG mechanism is not suitable
for dynamic spectrum allocation auctions even in wireless
networks of moderate size [6]. In general, VCG mechanism
is applicable in combinatorial auctions for sealed bid format,
where each player submits a bid for the channel without
the knowledge of other players bids in the auction. Unlike
second price auctions, VCG is applicable for single parameter
environment as well as multi-parameter environment. Next, we
describe the VCG mechanism for spectrum allocation.
2) Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism: We assume that
there are n BSs to participate in spectrum auction which leads
to 2n possibilities. Due to the interference across the BSs, all
2n combinations may not be feasible for spectrum allocation.
The BSs which are sufficiently far can be allocated channels
simultaneously. Let the binary vector x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
denote a feasible allocation satisfying all the interference
constraints, where xi = 1 if a channel is assigned to the
BS i, otherwise xi = 0. Let X denote the set of feasible
allocations. BS i submits a bid bi based on its valuation. Let
b = {b1, b2, . . . , bn}. The optimal allocation is given as
x? = arg max
x∈X
b · x. (1)
Now, a pricing scheme is defined to make the auction
strategy-proof. Using a pricing scheme, the players are en-
forced to submit true valuation of the object to the auctioneer.
VCG pricing scheme charges the BSs with the welfare loss
inflicted due to the presence of BS i.
Let ρi denote the price charged to BS i.
ρi = max
x∈X
∑
j 6=i
xj · bj −
∑
j 6=i
x?j · bj , (2)
where x? is the optimal allocation obtained from Equation (1).
The price charged using Equation (2) also ensures individual
rationality i.e., 0 ≤ ρi ≤ bi. In other words, any BS would
never be charged more than its submitted bid. The individual
rationality reflects that the utility gain at a BS can never be
negative if a BS bids at its true value.
Though VCG mechanism achieves the optimal channel allo-
cation for social welfare maximization, it becomes intractable
for large set of BSs. Hence, it is not feasible for practical
implementation. Next, we propose strategy-proof mechanisms
to maximize the social welfare of the spectrum for various
scenarios. The proposed algorithms are also computationally
efficient in comparison to VCG. VCG is implemented in two
steps: Channel Allocation (O(2n)) and Price Charging scheme
(O(2n)).
B. Notations and Definitions
We introduce the following notations:
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} represents the set of operators partic-
ipating in the spectrum auction in a geographical region.
• mi represents the number of base stations corresponding
to operator i.
• Si = {Si1, Si2, . . . , Simi} represents the set of base
stations of operator i.
• vij represents the true valuation of jth base station
corresponding to operator i (i.e., Sij).
• vi = [vi1, vi2, . . . , vimi ] represents the vector of true
valuations at base stations of operator i.
• bij represents the bid of Sij .
• bi = {bi1, bi2, . . . bimi} represents the vector of bids for
operator i.
• Ni represents the set of neighboring base stations which
are in conflict with the base stations of operator i (same
channel cannot be allocated simultaneously).
• xi represents the binary allocation vector corresponding
to operator i.
• xij represents the jth component of xi. xij = 1 signifies
channel is assigned otherwise not.
• Oi represents operators that are neighbors of i i.e.,
({operators j | Sj
⋂Ni 6= φ, j 6= i}).
• di = {di1, di2, . . . , dimi} represents the number of chan-
nels required at base stations of operator i.
• N(G′) represents the set of active operators from the
conflict graph G′ (operators with non-zero demand).
1) True valuation (σvi ) : True valuation σ
v
i of any operator
i is defined as the sum of the actual valuations (which
are private and not known to the auctioneer) of all the
BSs corresponding to operator i.
σvi =
mi∑
j=1
vij . (3)
2) Bidding valuation (σbi ) : Bidding valuation σ
b
i of oper-
ator i is defined as the sum of the bids (which may or
may not be same as the actual valuation) of all the BSs
corresponding to operator i.
σbi =
mi∑
j=1
bij . (4)
53) Price (pi): It is defined as the price that an operator i has
to pay, in case operator i wins the resources (channels),
else it is zero.
4) Operator Utility (Ui) : Utility of an operator i is the
difference between the operator valuation (unknown to
the auctioneer) and the price charged on the allocation of
the channel. If the operator does not get the channel, the
utility is zero. In other words, it represents the overall
gain of an operator i if it is allocated a channel.
Ui(bi, b−i) =
{
σvi − pi, if the channel is allocated
0, otherwise.
.
(5)
where bi is the bid vector of operator i and b−i represents bid
vectors of other operators except operator i.
Definition 1. An auction is truthful (strategy-proof) if there
is no incentive in deviating from the true valuation. Thus, the
dominant strategy is to bid at the true valuation no matter
what strategy others choose.
Ui(bi, b−i) ≤ Ui(vi, b−i) ∀bi,∀b−i. (6)
where vi is the vector of true valuations at the base stations
of operator i.
III. STRATEGY-PROOF AUCTION FOR UNIT DEMAND
In this section, we describe our proposed algorithm Single
Channel Strategy-proof Auction Mechanism (SC-SPAM) for
channel allocation among the base stations of multiple op-
erators. Recall the assumptions made in previous sections,
multiple BSs corresponding to an operator and one channel
availability. In auctions, the mechanism design has two steps:
channel allocation and price charging strategy. In channel
allocation phase the auctioneer decides to whom the right to
use the channel is provided. What price should be charged is
decided in pricing strategy phase. The price charged enforces
the operators to declare the true valuations in order to ensure a
strategy-proof auction. Now, we define critical operator which
is used later in the price charging strategy.
Definition 2. A critical operator C(i) of an operator i is
defined as the operator in Ni \ {i} whose sum of the bids
of base stations is maximum among all the operators in Ni
except i. The critical operator C(i) is given as any j ∈ Oi
such that∑
k∈{Ni
⋂
Sj}
bjk ≥
∑
k∈{Ni
⋂
S′j}
bj′k, ∀j′ 6= j, i and j′ ∈ Oi.
(7)
Let us define a set Lij = Ni∩Sj , which contains the BSs of
operator j in conflict with the BSs of operator i. Let Λij be the
valuation of set Lij which is given as, Λij =
∑
bjk1{Sjk∈Lij}.
The critical operator of an operator i can be obtained as
C(i) = arg max
j 6=i
Λij , j ∈ Oi and the critical operator valuation
σci is given as, σ
c
i = max
j 6=i
Λij , j ∈ Oi.
The strategy-proof algorithm proposed is described in Al-
gorithm 1. This algorithm takes conflict graph G and bid
Algorithm 1 Single Channel Strategy-proof Auction Mecha-
nism
1: Input: Conflict Graph G, bid vector, {bi}{i∈N}.
2: Output: Binary channel allocation vector {Xi}{i∈N},
price {pi}{i∈N}.
3: Initialize xi ← 0, N(G) = {1, 2, . . . , n}
4: Initialize pi ← 0, G′ ← G, N(G′) ← N(G), FLAG ←
True.
5: while (FLAG = True) do
6: Make i∗ ← arg max
i∈N(G′ )
σbi .
7: Find Ni∗ .
8: Set C(i∗) ← arg max
j 6=i∗
Λi
∗
j , j ∈ Oi∗ and σci∗ ←
max
j 6=i∗
Λi
∗
j , j ∈ Oi∗.
9: Make pi∗ ← σci∗ and xi∗ ← 1.
10: if (G′ ∩ (Si∗ ∪Ni∗) = G′) then
11: FLAG← False.
12: else
13: G′ ← G′\{Si∗ ∪Ni∗} .
14: end if
15: end while
A1 A2
A3
B1 B2 B3C1
C2
C3
Operator A
Operator B 
Operator C
(a)
1 2 3 Total
operator A 8 10 7 25
operator B 9 8 5 22
operator C 9 9 3 21
(b)
Fig. 2: Network of 3 operators (a) Conflict Graph (b) Bid
vector table corresponding to operator A, B and C.
vector corresponding to each operator {bi}{i∈N} as input. Bi-
nary channel allocation vector {xi}{i∈N} and payment vector
{pi}{i∈N} for all the operators are initialized to zero. Initially,
we determine the maximum bidding operator and its critical
neighbor C(i∗) = arg max
j 6=i
Λi
∗
j , j ∈ Oi∗ (line8). Channel al-
location vector, xi for the maximum bidding operator (winner)
is updated to 1 and the payment for the winning operator is
updated to the price of the critical neighbor valuation, σci∗ . The
conflict graph G′ is updated with the remaining nodes after the
removal of the nodes corresponding to the winning operator
i∗ and its neighboring nodes Ni∗ . Repeat the process until G′
is NULL (line 13), i.e., no other BSs is present in G′ . Next,
we explain Algorithm 1 through an example.
Example: Consider a network of 3 operators A,B,C,
where each operator has 3 BSs deployed in the region
to provide services to the subscribers. BSs {A1, A2, A3},
{B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3} correspond to operators A,
B and C, respectively. The conflict graph is illustrated in Fig.
2a based on the interference criteria.
6In Fig. 2b, the bid vector of each operator is shown. In
the first iteration, Operator A has the highest bid among the
operators with a value of σbA = 25. Therefore, Operator A is
allocated channel across BSs, and it has to pay the price of
its critical operator. As per Definition 2, critical operator for
winning operator A is operator C and pA = σcA = 18. Thus,
the utility of operator A = UA = 7. We update the conflict
graph with the BSs of operators B and C not in conflict with
the BSs of operator A. In second iteration, the updated G
comprises BSs B3 and C3. Operator B wins the channel and
pays the price, σcB = 3. The utility of operator B is 2. Operator
C is not allocated channel.
Now, if operator B tries to increase its utility by deviating
from its true valuation σvB = 22 to σ
b
B = 28 by increasing the
bid of its BSs, operator B will get channel being the highest
bidder among the operators. But, it has to pay the price of
its critical operator which is operator A and therefore, pays
σcB = 25. This leads to a negative utility −3 for operator
B. Thus, bidding at the true valuation is the best strategy for
an operator in the auction. Next, we prove that the proposed
algorithm follows monotonicity and strategy-proofness.
Lemma 1. If operator i is allocated a channel by bidding at
σbi , it will also be allocated if it bids σ
b′
i , where σ
b′
i ≥ σbi
provided all the other operators’ bids remain unchanged.
Proof. As stated in Algorithm 1, all the operator bids are
arranged in non-increasing order of the bids σbi ,∀i ∈ N . Let us
assume in the sorted list (S, say) operator i lies at position k.
Now, keeping all the other operator bids unchanged, increase
the bid of operator i to σb
′
i , and again arrange all the operator
bids in non-increasing order in another sorted list S′. Let us
say, the position of operator i in S′ is l, where l ≤ k. Thus,
the operator moves higher in the position which ensures that
it still gets the channel. This completes the proof.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 1 is individually rational.
Proof. As stated in the pricing scheme of Algorithm 1, win-
ning operator i is charged price pi = σci . Moreover, we know
winning operator i valuation is the highest among all operators.
∴ σbi > σbj , ∀ j 6= i. (8)
Using Definition 2, σci = max
j 6=i, j∈Oi
Λij . This implies that
σci ≤ max
j 6=i
σbj . (9)
From Equations [8] and [9], we get σci < σ
b
i . Hence, pi ≤ σbi .
This proves individual rationality of the algorithm.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 is strategy-proof.
Proof. Refer Appendix A.
IV. EXTENSION FOR NON UNIFORM DEMAND OF
CHANNELS AMONG THE BASE STATIONS OF OPERATORS
In this section, we extend SC-SPAM for the case where
the demand of channels across the BSs of an operator is
not uniform (or same). Instead the BSs of an operator may
have different channel requirements depending on the traffic
Algorithm 2 Non-uniform Demand Auction Mechanism
(NUD-AM)
Input: Conflict Graph G, K channels, bid vector,
{bi}{i∈N}, demand vector, {di}{i∈N}.
Output: Allocation vector {xi}{i∈N}, price {pi}{i∈N}.
1: Initialize demand vector d′i ← di, for every i, ` = K.
2: while (` > 0) do
3: Compute σbi (`) =
mi∑
j=1
bij1{dij>0}.
4: Allocate channel and compute price (Algorithm 1).
5: d′i ← d′i − xi for every i
6: procedure CONFLICT–GRAPH–UPDATION
7: If (dij = 0) update G′ ← G′ \ {Sij}
8: Else G′ ← G′
9: end procedure
10: `← `− 1.
11: end while
conditions. Let us define the demand of operator i as di =
{di1, . . . , dimi}, where dij represents the channel demand at
jth BS associated with operator i. It is assumed that the
operators do not have strict demand, i.e., they are willing to
accept any number of channels between 0 to dij at BS j.
Let us define,
σbi (l) =
mi∑
j=1
bij1{dij>0}, l = {1, . . .K}
for every operator i where bij is per channel bid value
corresponding to jth BS of operator i. σbi (l) computes the
valuation of each operator corresponding to demand of channel
at its BSs for a channel. As stated above, at least one channel is
required at all the BSs participating in auction of any operator,
therefore, σbi (1) = σ
b
i (Equation (4)).
We propose Non-uniform Demand Auction Mechanism
(NUD-AM) in Algorithm 2 which takes the demand vector
{di}i∈N as input along with the number of channels for
auction. Here, it is assumed that the valuation of the channel
increases linearly with the demand at any BS. The bid vector,
bi reflects per channel bid for BSs of an operator. In case,
the demand of the channel at any BS is r, then valuation
at the particular BS gets multiplied by the demand, i.e.,
r·vij . Channel allocation and price computation are performed
iteratively for each channel present in database. For each
channel allocation, we compute σbi (l), which determines the
operator valuation as per the demand at its BSs (line 3). Based
on the operator valuation, we determine channel allocation
and price charged from the operators using SC-SPAM. Then,
demand across BSs is updated based on the allocation vector
for every operator (line 5). Next, we update the conflict graph
before the next channel allocation. Channels are allocated
corresponding to σbi (l), to ensure the maximization of the
social welfare. The process continues until all the channels
are allocated. Next, we describe the operations of NUD-AM
with an example.
7A. Example
We consider a wireless network of 3 operators A, B and C.
Each operator has multiple BSs to provide services to the end
users in a geographical region. As illustrated in Fig.3, operator
A, B and C have BSs {A1, A2, A3, A4}, {B1, B2, B3, B4}
and {C1, C2}, respectively. We consider that the channel
demand across the BSs of an operator is not the same, and the
valuation at any BS increases linearly with the demand. We
consider 2 channels are available for auction. An operator can
bid for at most the number of channels available for auction
at any of its BSs. Each operator submits bid vector. As stated
above bids are linearly increasing with demand, the bid vector
contains bid per channel at each BS.
Fig. 3: Conflict graph of the 3 operators.
We consider the demand vectors for the operators A, B
and C are given as dA = [2 1 2 2], dB = [2 1 1 2] and
dC = [2 1], respectively. The bids at the BSs of operators A,
B and C are represented as bA = [8 10 7 6], bB = [8 9 9 10]
and bC = [10 9], respectively. Channel allocation procedure is
performed in two iterations.
Case 1 : All operators bid at true value across BSs.
• Iteration 1: First we determine the σbi (1), ∀ i = {A,B,C}.
σbA(1) = 31, σ
b
B(1) = 36 and σ
b
C(1) = 19. Similar to
the calculations shown in Section 1, Operators B and C
get channel at BSs {B1, B2, B3, B4} and {C1}. Now, we
obtain the price charged from the winners of the auction
using critical operator (Definition 2). The price charged from
operator pB = 31 and pC = 0. Next, we update the conflict
graph for second channel allocation with non-zero demand
across BSs as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: Updated conflict graph after the first iteration.
• Iteration 2: Again we perform same procedure as describe
in Iteration 1 on updated σbA(2) = 31, σ
b
B(2) = 18 and
σCA(2) = 19. Now, BSs {A1, A2, A3, A4} and {C2} get
channel corresponding to operators A and C. The price
charged from the operators which are allocated channels is
pA = 18 and pC = 0.
Case 2 : Except operator B all operators bid at true value.
Let Operator B deviates from the true valuation and submits
bB = (8, 6, 6, 9) to the auctioneer.
• Iteration 1: As Operator B deviates from the true
value, σbB(1) reduces to 29. Channels are allocated at
{A1, A2, A3, A4} and {C2} BSs of operators A and C,
respectively. The price charged are pA = 29 and pC = 0.
Next, update the conflict graph.
• Iteration 2: Channels are allocated on the updated graph
Fig. 5: Updated conflict graph after the first iteration.
shown in Fig. 5 at {B1, B2, B3, B4} and {C1} BSs of oper-
ators B and C, respectively. We observe that the demand at
the BS A2 is zero, so it is no longer the part of the conflict
graph. Therefore, the price charged from the operator B and
C are 21 and 0, respectively.
It is observed that operator B gets the same number of
channels in both the cases (true valuation and misreporting to
lower value). However, the price charged at the true value and
the deviated bid value are 31 and 21, respectively for operator
B. This clearly shows the utility gain of operator B is 10.
Hence, NUD-AM is not always strategy-proof.
As channel allocation procedure for a channel in NUD-AM
is same as SC-SPAM, therefore, NUD-AM is strategy-proof
individually for every iteration. But it may not be strategy-
proof as a whole. The reason behind NUD-AM not being
strategy-proof is the updation of the conflict graph after each
allocation. This results in removal of BSs where demand is
satisfied. This shows that addressing non-uniform demand
is challenging. Next, we present a new algorithm for this
purpose.
V. WEAKLY STRATEGY-PROOF ALGORITHM FOR
NON-UNIFORM DEMAND
Algorithm NUD-AM proposed in Section IV considers non-
uniform demand across the base stations of an operator where
the channel valuations increase linearly with the demand at the
base stations. As NUD-AM charges price sequentially from
the BSs in each step, it fails to be strategy-proof in certain
cases, e.g. if an operator chooses to bid lower than its true
valuation. In this section, we propose Non-uniform Demand
Weakly Strategy-proof Auction Mechanism (NUD-WSPAM)
which ensures that the operators have no incentive to deviate
from the true valuation even if the demand across BSs is non-
uniform and the bids at a BS is not linearly increasing function
of the demand.
Moreover, in comparison to the NUD-AM, we consider that
the channel valuations are not a linear function of the demand.
Hence, the operators are required to report the bid valuation
corresponding to multiple channel demand at each BS to the
auctioneer. We consider that the demand at any BS across the
network cannot be greater than the total number of channels
available in the spectrum database. Now, each operator reports
a bid vector for each BS associated with it. Let Bi denote the
bid for operator i. Here, Bi(`, j) is bid for demand ` at BS j of
8Algorithm 3 Non-uniform Demand Weakly Strategy-proof
Auction Mechanism (NUD-WSPAM)
Input: Conflict Graph G, K channels, non-increasing bid
vector, Bi{i∈N}, demand vector {di}{i∈N}.
Output: Channel allocation vector {xi}{i∈N}, price
{pi}{i∈N}
1: Initialize final allocation vector xfi ← 0, G
′ ← G
2: Initialize pi ← 0, bi = Bi(1, :) ∀i ∈ N
3: while (K > 0) do
4: Find x1, . . . , xn using Algorithm 1
5: Update xfi ← xfi + xi, ∀ i
6: Update di ← di − xfi , ∀ i
7: procedure BID –UPDATION
8: for i = 1 : n
9: for j = 1 : mi
10: bij = B(xfij + 1, j) end end
11: end procedure
12: procedure CONFLICT–GRAPH–UPDATION
13: see Algorithm 2
14: end procedure
15: K ← K − 1
16: end while
17: Charge price as per the Equation (12).
operator i if (`−1) channels are already assigned. We enforce
that the bids submitted by operators are non-increasing i.e.,
Bi(`, j) ≥ Bi(`+ 1, j), for all i, j, `.
This is motivated by the observation that marginal true value
per channel is also non-increasing with the demand [29].
In Algorithm 3, we present a generalized algorithm NUD-
WSPAM. Unlike previous mechanisms, NUD-WSPAM first
determines allocation for all the channels present in the
spectrum database and then computes the price to be charged.
At each iteration, a channel is allocated using Algorithm 1 for
every channel available in spectrum database as mentioned in
line 4. To compute the price, we update the conflict graph
which comprises of the BSs where channel requirement is not
satisfied after the allocation is complete. The price is charged
based on the critical operator in the final updated graph (line
17).
As described in Algorithm 3, allocation is performed itera-
tively for each channel and then the bids are updated after each
allocation for all the operators. The bid of operator i is Bi,
where BS j has multiple bids given as {Bi(`, j)|0 < ` ≤ dij}.
Let bri denote the active bids (maximum of bid for demand that
is not satisfied) at BSs of operator i in rth iteration. The bid
updation process is described in the Algorithm 3. We denote
bfi = b
L
i , where L is the last iteration. Therefore, bid vector b
f
i
projects the bids at the BSs of operator i for (K+1)th iteration,
where K is the number of channels available. The bid at BS j
of operator i in vector bfi is given as b
f
ij = Bi(xfij+1, j), where
xfij is final allocation of operator i at BS j or j
th component
of xfi . The vector b
f
i has the highest bid values corresponding
to unsatisfied demand (non-increasing bid assumption) for
operator i.
Let dfi , i ∈ O denote final demand vector of the operator
i after the allocation process is complete. Here, dfij = 0
signifies that the demand is satisfied at jth BS of operator
i. Furthermore, the set of BSs where demand is unsatisfied
is indicated Sfi i.e., S
f
i = {j|dfij > 0}. Based on Sfi , final
conflict graph Gf is obtained. Gf has BSs where demand is
not satisfied.
Let, Γij = Ni
⋂
Sfj denote the BSs of operator j in Gf
which are in neighborhood of BSs of operator i in initial
conflict graph G. We define the critical operator C(i) any
j ∈ Oi such that∑
k∈Γij
bfjk ≥
∑
k∈Γi
j′
bfj′k, ∀j′ 6= j, j′ ∈ Oi. (10)
For single channel auction, Equation (10) reduces to Defini-
tion 2. The only difference is that the BSs where the demand is
zero after allocation process are no longer part of the conflict
graph Gf . We compute valuation of operator j which are not
allocated channel χij . Critical operator valuation σ
c
i is obtained
using Equation (12).
χij =
∑
k∈Γij
bfjk. (11)
σci = χ
i
C(i). (12)
The price charged from operator i is pi = σci . This price
reduces to the earlier critical operator valuation mentioned in
Section III for single channel scenario.
Here we define a new concept of weak strategy-proofness:
Definition 3. Let Bi denote true valuation of operator i. An
auction is said to be weakly strategy-proof if an operator does
not gain by deviating to B˜i from Bi, where B˜i satisfies either
(1) ∃ j such that B˜i(`, j) > Bi(`, j), ∀` or (2) ∃ j such that
B˜i(`, j) < Bi(`, j), ∀`. i.e.,
Ui(B˜i,B−i) ≤ Ui(Bi,B−i) ∀ B˜i&B−i. (13)
where, B˜i satisfy conditions (1) or (2) and B−i =
{B1, . . . ,Bi−1,Bi+1, . . . ,Bn} is tuple with bid of all other
operators except operator i.
A. Example
We revisit the Example IV-A in context of NUD-WSPAM.
The wireless network is illustrated in Fig. 3 is same except the
channel valuation at a BS is no longer linearly increasing with
the demand. As stated earlier, per channel valuation is non-
increasing function of demand at any BS. An operator can bid
for at most the number of channels available for auction at any
BS. We consider demand vectors to be same as mentioned in
the example previously. Let qij represents the bid vector at BS
j of operator i corresponding to its demand. The bid at BSs
of operator A are given as BA = [qTA1 qTA2 qTA3 qTA4], where
qA1 = [8 5], qA2 = [10 0] and qA3 = [7 3] and qA4 = [6 3].
Here, aT indicate the transpose of a. The bid for operator B
is BB = [qTB1 qTB2 qTB3 qTB4], where qB1 = [8 4], qB2 = [9 0],
qB3 = [9 0] and qB4 = [10 3]. The bid for operator C is
BC = [qTC1 qTC2], where qC1 = [10 5], qC2 = [9 0].
9Case 1: All operators reveal their true valuations
• Iteration 1: From the given bid vectors, we determine the
bids of operators for the allocation σA = 31, σB = 36 and
σC = 19. The channel is allocated at all the BSs of the
highest bidding operator. Then channel is allocated to the
BSs of the remaining operators in the order of decreasing
valuations which do not conflict with the BSs that are already
allocated channel. Therefore, the channel is allocated to
operator B at {B1, B2, B3, B4} and operator C at {C1} BSs.
• Iteration 2: For second channel allocation, demand and bid
vectors are updated depending on the allocation in previous
iteration. The updated demand vectors are dA = [2 1 2 2],
dB = [1 0 0 1] and dC = [1 1]. The operators valuation for
the iteration is determined from the updated bid σA = 31,
σB = 7 and σC = 19. Channel is allocated to operator A at
{A1, A2, A3, A4} and operator C at {C2} BSs.
This completes the channel allocation phase. Now, the
demand at the operators is dA = [1 0 1 1], dB = [1 0 0 1]
and dC = [1 0].
Fig. 6: Updated conflict graph after channel allocation phase
is complete.
Price Charging Step: In Algorithm 3, the price is charged
after all the channels are allocated based on the BSs where
demand is non-zero. We construct the conflict graph with the
BSs having demand greater than zero as illustrated in Fig.
6. Each operator is charged as per their critical operator (see
Definition 2). The sum of the highest bids of the BSs {B1, B4}
of operator B for which demand is not satisfied comprise the
critical operator of operator A. Similarly, the bids of BSs
{A1, A3, A4} constitute the critical operator for operator B
and the bid at the BS {A3} is critical operator bid for operator
C. Thus, the price charged from operator A, B and C is given
by pA = 7, pB = 11 and pC = 3.
Case 2: Operator B deviates from true valuation and bids
at a lower value
Now, we revisit the wireless network mentioned in Fig. 3, con-
sidering that except the operator B others submit bid equal to
true value for the associated BSs. The demand vector of all the
operators remain unchanged as in the first case. We consider
that operator bid is B′B = [q
′
B1
T
, q
′
B2
T
, q
′
B3
T
, q
′
B4
T
], where
q
′
B1 = (8, 4), q
′
B2 = (6, 0), q
′
B3 = (6, 0) and q
′
B4 = (9, 3).
As described in Case 1, channel is allocated to the operators.
• Iteration 1: Here, the operator bids for channel allocation
are σA = 31, σB = 29 and σC = 19. Operators A and C are
allocated channel at the BSs {A1, A2, A3, A4} and {C2}.
• Iteration 2: Second channel is allocated to BSs
{B1, B2, B3, B4} and {C1}.
We can see that operator B gets channel at their BSs
in iteration 2. Channel allocation remains same even after
deviating from true valuation. Next, we determine the price
charged from the operators.
Price Charging Step: We update the conflict graph based
on the remaining channel demand across the BSs of every
operator as illustrated in the Fig. 6. Then, we determine
the price charged from every operator based on the critical
operator. The price charged remains the same as it is obtained
for Case 1 (operators reveal their true valuations).
From the above example, it is seen that the deviation from
true valuation does not provide utility gain. Thus, operators
have no incentive in misreporting the true valuation. Hence,
Algorithm 3 is strategy-proof.
As we defined earlier, σbi (k) =
∑
j
bkij , where b
k
i =
[bki1 . . . b
k
imi
] has the bids at which operator i demands channel
at its BSs in kth iteration of allocation.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 3 is individually rational.
Proof. As per the assumption, marginal bid per channel de-
creases with the demand ` at any BS i.e., Bi(`, j) ≥ Bi(`′, j)
for ` < `′ for all operator i, BS j. Therefore, each operator
bid is non-increasing sequentially in the allocation process i.e.,
σbi (k) ≥ σbi (k′) for k < k′, where k denotes channel allocation
iteration.
Operator i with maximum bid gets channel in each iteration.
As stated in Algorithm 3, updated graph Gf comprises BSs
{s|s ∈ Sfj ,∀j}. Operator i is charged as σci = max
j 6=i
χij . As
proved in Lemma (2), σci (k) ≤ σbi (k), for all k. But, in Algo-
rithm 3, σci is determined from Gf . Therefore, σci ≤ σci (k),∀k.
Let xfi denote the final allocation vector for operator i. We
denote the sum of the channel bids corresponding to allocation
vector xfi is α
b
i . Thus, α
b
i =
mi∑
j=1
xfi (j)∑`
=1
Bi(`, j). Moreover, αbi ≥
σbi (1), where σ
b
i (1) is operator i bid for first channel. As we
know σci < σ
b
i , therefore σ
c
i < α
b
i . Now, the price charged is
given by
pi = α
b
i − σci ,
≤ αbi . (∵ 0 ≤ σci ≤ αbi ).
Thus, 0 ≤ pi ≤ αbi . This proves that the Algorithm 3 is
individually rational.
Lemma 5. In Algorithm 3, suppose final allocation vectors
of operator i are xfi and x˜
f
i at bids (Bi,B−i) and (B˜i,B−i),
respectively. If there exists some j B˜i(`, j) > Bi(`, j) ∀`,
then x˜fi − xfi ≥ 0. This implies that the number of channels
allocated across the BSs of operator i at B˜i are atleast equal
to the number of channels allocated at Bi.
Proof. As per the assumption in Section V, B˜i(`, j) ≥
B˜i(`′, j) such that ` < `′ for all BSs j. Let operator i be
allocated channels in k iterations in the allocation process at
Bi. As channel allocation is performed greedily based on the
bid, with bid B˜i ≥ Bi, it must be allocated at least k iterations.
Since B−i is unchanged, operator i may get a channel in more
than k iterations, if increase in bid results in σbi > σ
b
j , for j 6= i
in more iterations in the allocation process.
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Theorem 6. Algorithm 3 is weakly strategy-proof .
Proof. Refer Appendix B.
VI. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISMS
In this section, we summarize the key features (strategy-
proofness and computational complexity) of the proposed
mechanisms and the various scenarios in Table I.
TABLE I: Summary
Algorithms Scenario Strategy-
proof
Computational
Complexity
SC-SPAM Single channel, Uniform de-
mand
Strong O(mn2)
NU-AM Multi-channel, Non-uniform
demand,linearly bid
No O(K ·mn2)
NUD-
WSPAM
Multi-channel, Non-uniform
demand, non-linear bid
Weak O(K ·mn2)
In above Table, n is the number of operators, m =
n∑
i=1
mi is
the total number of BSs across all the operators present in the
region, and K is the number of channels available for auction.
The detailed computation complexity analysis of SC-SPAM is
presented in [1]. For K channel availability, computational
complexity becomes O(K · mn2) using similar analysis as
given for SC-SPAM.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithms in multi-operator settings in a wireless network. In
the simulations, we consider 3 operators providing services in
a region. We model the wireless network by creating conflict
graphs G = (V, E) using the configuration model [30]. To
create overall topology of the wireless network in a given
region, we first generate three conflict graphs G12, G13, G23.
Here, Gij represents conflict graph among the BSs of operators
i and j. Using the conflict graphs, we obtain corresponding
binary interference matrices I12, I13 and I23, where Iij
represents the interference among the BSs of operator i and
operator j. In an interference matrix, 1 indicates interfering
pair of BSs. Further, we obtain interference matrices Iji from
the transpose of matrix Iij . The overall interference matrix
I of wireless access network in the region is obtained using
I12, I13, I23, I21, I31, and I32. We perform Monte Carlo
simulations for various scenarios. All the results are obtained
by averaging over 50 different topologies. All simulations are
performed in MATLAB [14].
We evaluate the performance of the algorithms based on the
following parameters:
• Spectrum utilization: It is defined as the total number of
BSs which are assigned channels across all the operators,
i.e.,
n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
xij , where xij denote the allocation at jth BS
of operator i.
• Social welfare: Social welfare is defined as the sum of
the bids corresponding to the BSs which are allocated
channels.
We compare the proposed algorithms with VCG [6] and
SMALL [11] mechanisms. As discussed earlier, VCG mech-
anism chooses an allocation with the highest social welfare
(optimal) from the set of all the feasible allocations. SMALL
groups the non-conflicting BSs together and determines the
group valuation for each group. The group valuation is ob-
tained as the number of BSs with bid greater than the minimum
bid of the group times the minimum bid. Channel is allocated
to the highest bidding group and all the BSs except the one
with minimum bid are charged with the minimum bid in the
group.
A. Performance evaluation of SC-SPAM
The bids across the BSs are uniformly distributed in the
interval [15, 25] for each operator. As VCG becomes compu-
tationally intractable for large networks, we restrict our simu-
lations to small size networks which vary from 6 to 21 BSs.
In this case, single channel is available in spectrum database.
In Fig. 7, we observe that the social welfare and the spectrum
utilization of SC-SPAM are close to the optimal obtained
from VCG. However, SC-SPAM outperforms SMALL in both
spectrum utilization and social welfare.
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Fig. 7: Performance comparison of the VCG, SC-SPAM and
SMALL in three operator scenario.
B. Performance evaluation of SC-SPAM for multiple channels
Next, we compare the performance of SC-SPAM with
SMALL [11] in large networks with the number of BSs
ranging from 30 to 300. We consider that 3 channels are
available in the spectrum database. Each BS has a demand
of 2 channels for all the operators. Each operator submits
a bid vector which has per channel valuation at every base
station. The operators choose bids uniformly between [10, 25].
From Fig. 8, we observe that the performance of the proposed
mechanism for multiple channel allocation is better than that
of SMALL. Here, spectrum utilization is determined as the
total number of channels allocated across the BSs of all the
operators. The trend observed justifies the following facts:
First, SMALL sacrifices the BSs with minimum bid to achieve
strategy-proofness, resulting in lower social welfare. Second,
BSs only in winning groups are allocated channel, even though
there may be some BSs which do not conflict with the winning
BSs. Further, it is seen that the performance of SMALL
degrades with an increase in the number of BSs in the region.
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Fig. 8: Performance comparison for uniform demand d = 2
and 3 number of available channels for auction across the BSs
of multiple operators.
C. Performance evaluation of NUD-WSPAM
We consider channel demand at any BS to be function of
the traffic in the cell. The demand at any BS is uniformly
distributed in the interval [0, 3]. We perform simulations to
evaluate the number of channels required to satisfy the de-
mands across the BSs for all operators in the region. In Fig.9,
we observe that the number of channels required to fulfill the
demand for all the operators shows similar trend irrespective
of the number of BSs. The number of channels required for
the wireless network of 150 BSs remains same as that of 300
BSs. The reason for this behavior is that the degree distribution
of BSs does not change with the size of the network (number
of BSs).
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Fig. 9: Comparison of spectrum utilization and number of
channels for NUD-WSPAM in large networks.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of spec-
trum allocation at operator level, for mutiple operator co-
existence in a region. We consider multiple base stations to
be associated with an operator to provide services to the
end users. Therefore, an operator has demand and valuation
corresponding to each BS associated with it. To address the
issue of multiple valuations at an operator, we have modeled
the spectrum allocation problem among non-cooperative op-
erators in multi-parameter environment with an objective of
maximizing the social welfare of the system. First, we propose
a strategy-proof mechanism for single channel demand across
BSs of co-existing operators. Then we extend it for multiple
channels considering non-uniform demand across the BSs of
the operators. We prove that the mechanisms SC-SPAM and
NUD-WSPAM are guaranteed to be strategy-proof and weakly
strategy-proof, respectively. The performances of the proposed
algorithms are evaluated using Monte Carlo simulations and
compared with those of the other existing mechanisms. The
performances of the proposed mechanisms are near optimal in
terms of spectrum utilization and social welfare. Furthermore,
the analysis of computational complexity reveals that the
proposed mechanisms are implementable in large networks in
real time scenarios. Thus, the proposed mechanisms solve the
issue of intractability arising in VCG mechanism.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
To show the strategy-proofness of the algorithm, possible
scenarios can be divided into two categories:
Scenario 1 : A operator i tries to deviate from truthfulness by
bidding greater than the true valuation, i.e., σbi > σ
v
i .
Case (i): Operator i does not win the channel even after
bidding untruthfully at σbi , greater than σ
v
i . Hence, it will have
utility, Ui = 0.
Case (ii): Operator i wins the channel at its bidding valuation
σbi (which is greater than the true valuation) as well as its
true valuation σvi . It will have positive utility, Ui = σvi − pi,
which is same as in the case operator bids at the true valuation.
Thus, bidding at higher valuation does not lead to any extra
incentive.
Case (iii): Operator i wins channel at σbi , but looses at σ
v
i .
Here, Operator i gets channel on higher bid (by misreporting)
which is greater than its critical operator bid (Algorithm 1).
But, it has to pay higher price which results in negative utility.
Ui = σvi − pi,
= σvi − σci where pi = σci ,
≤ 0. (∵ σvi < σci ).
Scenario 2 : Operator i tries to deviate from truthfulness by
bidding less than the true valuation, i.e., σbi < σ
v
i .
Case (i): Operator i looses the channel at σbi as well as its
true valuation, σvi . Thus, it will have Ui = 0.
Case (ii): Operator i wins the channel at σbi as well as its true
valuation, σvi which follows from monotonicity. Thus, it will
have Ui = σvi − pi.
Case (iii) : Operator i looses at σbi , but wins bidding at σ
v
i .
Thus, the operator suffers loss by deviating to untruthful value
with zero utility. However, bidding at σvi results in channel
allocation to operator i with non-negative utility Ui = σvi −pi.
From the above scenarios, it can be seen that bidding at
σbi 6= σvi , does not improve the utility of operator. Thus,
σbi = σ
v
i is the weakly dominant strategy for operator i. This
completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 6
To prove the strategy-proofness, we are required to show
that the deviation from the true valuation for any operator can
never increase the utility. We consider two scenarios: (1) if an
operator bids at a value higher than the true value, and (2) if
an operator bids at a value less than the true valuation.
Let σti denote the sum of the true valuations at the BSs of
operator i for the allocated channels.
Let βti denote the sum of the bids of the channels allocated
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across the BSs of operator i.
Critical valuation, utility and final conflict graph at βti are
denoted as σ˜ci , U˜i and G˜f , respectively. Let xfi and x˜if denote
the final allocation vector of operator i with bids σti and β
t
i ,
respectively. Further, we define x˜if > x
f
i , if ∃ at least a BS `
such that x˜if (`) > x
f
i (`).
Scenario 1 : The operator bid is more than the true valuation
of the channels allocated at its BSs, σti < β
t
i . Here, again we
may have following cases:
Case (i): Final allocation vector for all operators remains
unchanged i.e., x˜if = x
f
i , ∀ i. Therefore, C(i) and σci for
operator i remains the same even at βti . Hence, operator utility
Ui remains the same.
Case (ii): Operator i is allocated more number channels i.e.,
x˜i
f > xfi . Since supply is limited, number of channels allo-
cated to some operators other than i decreases i.e., x˜jf < x
f
j
such that j 6= i. Let us say, operator i is allocated extra
channels in iteration k. Then, σbi (k) > σ
b
j(k) > σ
v
i (k) for
j 6= i. However, at true value unsatisfied BSs of operator i are
not allocated channel and are present in Gf . Due to untruthful
bidding of operator i, G˜f comprise of the BSs of operator j
with higher aggregate true valuation. Therefore, σ˜ci > σ
c
i , this
implies U˜i < Ui. Hence, deviation from true value does not
increases utility of operator i.
Case (iii): Operator i is allocated less number channels i.e.,
x˜i
f < xfi . This is not possible due to monotonicity (Lemma
5).
Scenario 2 : The operator bid is less than the true valuation
of the channels allocated at its BSs, i.e., σti > β
t
i .
Case (i): The number of channels allocated across the BSs
and the final allocation vector remains unchanged.
With the similar argument as in Case (a) of Scenario 1. The
utility of the operator i does not change.
Case (ii): Operator i is allocated more number channels i.e.,
x˜i
f > xfi . This is not possible due to monotonicity (see
Lemma 5).
Case (iii): Operator i is allocated less number channels i.e.,
x˜i
f < xfi . As the number of channels allocated decrease on
deviation from the σti , operator i suffers loss.
Thus, we establish that the deviation from true valuation
does not lead to utility gain. Therefore, the proposed algorithm
is weakly strategy-proof.
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